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‘Post-liberal’ peacebuilding and the crisis of international authority 
 
 
Peter Finkenbusch 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how pragmatic approaches to peacebuilding might undermine 
the capacity of international policymakers to formulate a purposive, socially 
transformative project for their engagement with the Global South. Focusing on Oliver 
Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty’s recent work on ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilding, the 
analysis draws out how notions of ‘the everyday’, hybridity and ‘the local’ are geared 
towards disassembling the existing stock of reductionist liberal-universal knowledge 
claims. These were the ideological basis on which international interveners used to 
cohere their policy frameworks towards the Global South. Pragmatic approaches posit 
that the key to successful post-conflict transition lies in local – non-western, non-
universalist – epistemologies and that empowering this pool of idiosyncratic insider 
understandings requires the deconstruction of modern liberal-universalist forms of 
knowing. While this dynamic of analytical and normative self-deconstruction is 
heralded as an opportunity for radical change ‘from below’, it simultaneously corrodes 
international authority as the ability to initiate and transform. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article is about the way in which ‘post-liberal’ approaches to peacebuilding hinder 
international policy elites from formulating a socially transformative project for their 
engagement with the Global South. By deconstructing the liberal-universal foundations 
of international policy approaches, ‘post-liberal’ arguments undercut policymakers’ 
capacity to ‘create and initiate’.1 While the regulatory ambit of post-Cold War 
interventions has grown notably, Western governments and international organisations 
seem to be finding it increasingly difficult to pursue a purposive political project vis-à-
vis post-conflict and other transitional societies. As David Chandler has recently 
pointed out, Western interveners are more and more concerned ‘not to be taking over 
decision-making processes, to be setting external goals, or to be measuring progress 
using external yardsticks’.2 This reluctance and self-restraint stands in stark contrast to 
the original peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s which ‘believed that improving 
knowledge of conflict and peace processes would enable a willing international  
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community to resolve […] problems’.3 This type of ‘solutionism’ was able to focus on the 
‘technical questions of sequencing and speed’ because it was based on the assumption 
that interveners possessed ‘superior knowledge’, prompting them to ‘undertake more 
comprehensive and extensive interventions to secure global peace’.4 Interestingly, 
rejecting these premises seems to have become the ‘new mainstream’.5 And the way this 
‘new mainstream’ has formed is through the idea that peacebuilding should start looking 
‘beyond liberalism’.6 While previous interventions were premised on the idea that 
‘liberalism offered a key for solving’7 the problems of post-conflict societies, it would 
appear as if contemporary ‘post-liberal’ frameworks are built on the understanding that 
the ideas associated with the liberal peace are, in fact, the biggest barrier to successful 
intervention. As Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond write, ‘the crisis at the 
international level is […] internal’.8 While the policy impact of ‘post-liberal’ arguments 
might be limited, they seem to reflect with unparalleled clarity the wide-spread distrust of 
modern liberal-universal epistemology. With this concern in mind, the paper 
reconstructs critically the genealogy of the ‘post-liberal’ approach. The goal is to bring 
out how the construction of radical local agency beyond liberal-universal epistemology 
might be facilitating a policy impasse: Although post-conflict and post-colonial subjects 
are seen as in need of outside facilitation, international interveners are increasingly 
unable to purposefully and instrumentally engage with international governance 
problems.  
The analysis begins by revisiting the classic neoliberal position which Roland Paris 
formulated in his famous ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’ strategy.9 The 
purpose is to showcase how classic neoliberal frameworks depend on a quite 
accentuated epistemic hierarchy between capable interveners and incapable 
intervened and continue to valorise modern universalist episteme over idiosyncratic 
local forms of knowing. Paris’ IBL strategy clings to the ultimate goal of liberal market 
democracy but emphasises the importance of putting in place the necessary 
sociocultural preconditions for pluralist politics and market economics. In doing so, IBL 
seems to call naturally for a thorough transformation of intervened societies ‘requiring 
changes in behavior, expectations and norms’.10 
Foucauldian governmentality studies have picked up on the neoliberal portrayal of 
intervention as a new ‘mission civilisatrice’.11 They have opposed international 
intervention for its disciplinary character reflected in what they see as a top-down 
imposition of standardized liberal-universal templates.12 Here, the ‘new 
interventionism’13 is interpreted as a set of intrusive disciplinary techniques curbing 
local cultural diversity into conformity with a Western liberal ideal of the subject, market 
and state. 
‘Post-liberal’ authors, in turn, feed off the governmentality critique. Like Foucauldian 
governmentality studies, they call for a broadening of civil society participation in order 
to incorporate the full range of local voices. Richmond’s notion of the ‘local-local’ 
indicates the existence of genuine grass-roots actors hidden by reductionist liberal-
universal episteme. It articulates the search for radical alterity beyond liberal 
universalism.14 The key point is that accessing and enabling the ‘local-local’ involves 
‘confronting the edifice of Western ontological assumptions and […] epistemologies 
[…] without resorting to new metanarratives of “peace”’.15 The problem for ‘post-liberal’ 
peacebuilders in this situation is that ‘local-locals’ are largely invisible to Western 
  
3 
 
interveners who are steeped in reductionist liberal-universal modes of thinking. By 
setting up local participation as an ‘engage[ment] with those who cannot speak’16 or 
are invisible to the reductionist liberal-universal gaze from above, international 
interveners can never be sure they are talking to the right people (read ‘local-locals’) 
and are enabling them in a non-imposing way. ‘Post-liberal’ peacebuilders are 
constantly invited to give up some more of their obstructive liberal-universal baggage if 
they really want to access and enable radical alterity from below. They are constantly 
forced to surrender the analytical and normative foundations on which they used to 
construct their foreign policy outlook. Wanting to work exclusively through what is 
thought to already be in place, i.e. the ‘local-local’, and by constructing it as 
‘fundamentally different’17 from the modern liberal-universal world, international 
interveners become increasingly passive and status quo-oriented. Their normative 
ambitions are shrinking and they are less and less in a position to initiate purposive 
political change. It would appear as if purposive social transformation led by 
international actors necessitates some sort of ideological framework capable of 
reducing empirical complexity to a pre-theorised set of foundational concepts, 
categories and assumptions. Heeding to this critique would involve a return to 
ideological foundationalism – liberal or other – which at this point seems unlikely. 
 
 
Neoliberals 
 
One may start the genealogy of ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilding with the work of Roland 
Paris. For Paris, international interventions after the Cold War have been trying to 
‘“transplant” the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic 
affairs of peripheral host states’.18 
According to Paris, the problem with peacebuilding in the early 1990s was its naïve 
neglect of the question of transition, i.e. ‘the distinction between liberalism and liberali-
zation’.19 That is, liberal peace advocates had been ‘assuming[ing] away [the existence 
of] effective state institutions’: ‘They have tended to “bracket” or ignore the question of 
whether functioning governments exist’.20 Here, Paris puts special emphasis on the 
selection role of interveners to ‘promote “good” civil society while simultaneously 
restraining its “bad” variant’.21 ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’ was a way of 
expressing the view that peacebuilders had been underestimating the importance of 
societal blockages which were supposedly preventing liberal democratic institutions 
from working properly. Successful transition therefore would involve enhanced policy 
efforts on the sociocultural preconditions of liberal market democracy. Paris’ IBL 
strategy does not reject liberal market democracy per se ‘but question[s] the process 
and timeframe’ for its realisation.22 In other words, classic neoliberal authors cling to 
‘the “end stage” of liberal democratic societies’23 but want to move from quick fixes to a 
‘more holistic[…]’24 engagement with the intricacies of local state-society relations. In 
this way, IBL is a pledge for more comprehensive and ‘deeper’ intervention. Classic 
neo-liberals call for ‘societal transformation’ brought about by ‘long-term strategies 
involving large segments of society and extensive education and sensitivity 
campaigns’.25 Against this background of thorough-going policy involvement and 
(benevolent) tutelage, talking about local ownership would be ‘at best disingenuous’: 
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‘Ownership is certainly the intended end of such operations, but almost by definition it 
is not the means’.26 On the contrary, classic neoliberals stress the degree to which 
‘malvol[ent] and incapa[ble]’ 27 locals may profit from international expert knowledge. In 
Simon Chesterman’s eyes, the problem is ‘not that transitional administration is 
colonial in character’ but that it is ‘not colonial enough’.28 So, while classic neoliberal 
frameworks, like IBL, arguably constitute a shift away ‘from address-ing causes in 
universal and linear ways and towards a focus on endogenous processes and new-
institutionalist framings’,29 there is still a quite strong hierarchy in terms of superior 
international expertise and associated forms of governance. There is still in Paris’ work 
a palpable desire to remodel intervened societies in quite fundamental ways by an 
externally-driven reform project and with an idealized notion of liberal market 
democracy in mind. A pronounced idea of tutor and disciple still animates the 
engagement with the allegedly illiberal Other. With this notion of epistemic superiority 
in mind, it is possible to understand how Paris was able to claim and welcome the idea 
that the ‘new interventionism’30 was an ‘updated version of the mission civilisatrice’.31 
As we will see next, his embrace of intrusive intervention and (re-)education has turned 
Paris’ work into the target of a sustained and very popular critique by Foucauldian 
governmentality studies. 
 
 
Foucauldian governmentality studies 
 
The Foucauldian governmentality perspective recurs immediately on the neoliberal 
account sketched above. That is, Foucauldian governmentality studies build their 
analyses – and normative evaluations, for that matter – directly on the assertion that 
contemporary inter-national interventions aim at the ‘creation of liberal polities’,32 or, as 
Paris would have it, are ‘based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-
oriented economics’.33 Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojanen argue that Western intervention 
constitutes ‘an attempt to build the capacity of “weak” Southern states to attain more 
responsible “citizenship” in the international community of liberal democracies’.34 
Equally, Foucauldian governmentality studies seem to have bought into the rather 
frank concession by neoliberals that local participation and ownership should be seen 
as rhetorical or pro forma (see Chesterman above). In this context, Foucauldian 
governmentality studies have elaborated extensively on the disciplining nature of 
neoliberal empowerment and civil society discourses.35 Alastair Fraser sums up the 
Foucauldian governmentality view on local ownership in this way: ‘[P]articipation 
disciplines individual participants’.36 Where indigenous knowledge is encouraged this 
is done in a purely exploitative, functionalised and highly asymmetric way: ‘The 
purpose of “input” was not to learn about villagers’ aspirations or engage in debate. It 
was to reform their aspirations and alter their conduct. The intended outcome […] was 
determined in advance’.37 What matters here is how this kind of critique has, in turn, 
been the point of departure for ‘post-liberal’ approaches to peacebuilding, as we will 
see in the next section.38  
 
 
‘Post-liberal’ peacebuilding  
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In this section, I would like to reconstruct how ‘post-liberal’ authors have assimilated 
the Foucauldian governmentality critique sketched above. Oliver Richmond, for 
instance, sees international intervention in the social, economic and political affairs of 
post-conflict societies as marked by a ‘governmentalising distance and biopolitical 
tendency’.39 According to Richmond, intervention is meant to ‘tutor local actors away 
from their pathologies’.40 In a critique that neatly mirrors Murray Li’s argument on local 
civil society participation and ownership, Richmond complains that internationals ‘turn 
to local cultural practices in order to assimilate them into the top–down construction of 
the liberal peace’.41 They see the local simply as the object of ‘social engineering 
projects associated with the liberal peace’.42 Similar to Foucauldian governmentality 
critics,43 this ‘liberal imperialism’ is seen as asserting a ‘superior moral order, 
knowledge, justice and freedom and [the] devaluing, indeed discounting, [of] local 
experiences’.44 
In response, ‘post-liberal’ authors have proposed ‘a far greater consideration and 
respect for alternative modes of politics or polities’.45 Rather than ‘presume[ing] [a] 
uniform or “virgin” territory in the areas in which peacebuilding occurs’, international 
interveners should try to pay much more attention to the rich local traditions and 
indigenous social practices which are already in place and may hold important 
ideational and political potential for peace.46 The ethos of this ‘much more 
empowering’47 approach is to distance oneself from the ‘unbecoming liberal claims that 
the post-conflict polity and post-conflict individual should all “become liberal”’.48 For 
‘post-liberal’ scholars, taking the ‘next step’49 in peace-building involves a self-critical 
reappreciation of the much more limited applicability of ‘liberal democracy, liberal 
human rights, market values, the integration of societies into globalization and the 
centralized secular state’50 in ‘fundamentally’51 different contexts. Peacebuilding would 
no longer demand of the Other to ‘become liberal’.52 Instead of ‘identify[ing] the local 
as deviant’,53 peace processes should open up for a ‘much more localized social, 
academic, policy and customary epistemic base’.54 In fact, accusing others of failing to 
reach the liberal peace ‘is to miss the point’55 of the local and the everyday entirely. In 
‘post-liberal’ frameworks of understanding, the local and the everyday are precisely 
about the aspiration to get in touch with constituencies ‘beyond the artificial 
parameters of the liberal state and induced liberal civil society’.56  
 The reading of the liberal peace as blocking local agency has been voiced by a host 
of other ‘post-liberal’ authors. Roger Mac Ginty, for example, has warned of the 
‘vertical and linear picture’ of intervention which might be ‘overly simplistic’ and, hence, 
‘overlook[…] the agency of local actors’.57 And Jason Franks points out that the ‘classic 
liberal peace framework’ has facilitated ‘a complete failure to engage with the local 
cultural-political systems and instead [has] look[ed] to replace them from above with 
Western patterns of liberal democracy’.58 
At this point, we may clarify some of the differences and commonalities between the 
classic neoliberal approach exemplified by Paris’ IBL strategy and the ‘post-liberalism’ 
of Richmond, Mac Ginty and others. To begin with, it seems to deserve special 
emphasis that both approaches represent ‘varieties on the theme of problematizing the 
alleged imposition of liberal forms upon the non-liberal or a-liberal Other’.59 In the 
classic neoliberal as well as the ‘post-liberal’ perspective, the problem of the liberal 
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peace is the ‘existence of a non-liberal Other, which is either culturally or politically not 
amenable to liberal’60 policy. As Susanna Campbell, David Chandler and Meera 
Sabaratnam write:  
   
Both the authors who are more sympathetic to the liberal peace [such as Paris 
and Chesterman] and those who advocate a post-liberal […] peace [Richmond, 
Mac Ginty et al.] emphasize the binary division of the world into, on the hand, a 
set of liberal actors with […] interventionist capacities and, on the other, a set 
of non- or a-liberal actors in post-conflict or transitional countries who are seen 
to provide the problem in need of resolution […].61 
  
Where they seem to differ is in their willingness to give up liberal-universal goals and 
assumptions in order to enable a new kind of engagement with the non-liberal Other. 
To be sure, both share a ‘desire to alter these [“liberal-universalist”] assumptions and 
become more context-sensitive’.62 But there seems to be a marked schism between 
those authors who vie to improve ‘performance’ through better ‘sequencing (for 
example, establishing institutions before liberalization) or increasing “local ownership”, 
participation and consultation’ and those who have begun to question the general 
‘suitability of liberal political and economic values’63 and claim to be looking for ‘local 
alternatives’64 even when these are ‘far-removed from the worldview of liberal peace 
donors’.65 As Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh laments, most practitioners still share a 
consensus that peacebuilding should be based on the idea that ‘establishing free 
markets, rule of law, and liberal democracy could in principle lead to a sustainable 
peace’.66 In contrast, ‘imposing […] liberal notions of liberty’ is categorically rejected in 
the ‘critical literature’.67 In ‘post-liberal’ approaches, even the goal of liberal market 
democracy is problematic. In this view, internationals should not even ‘attempt’ to 
transfer liberal market democracy because ‘doing so creates or aggravates 
dysfunctional-ism and interrupts indigenous processes and may in fact prolong 
instability’.68 Compared to classic neoliberal frameworks, like IBL, it appears as if ‘post-
liberal’ perspectives put far greater emphasis on ‘organic processes of endogenous 
development’ and are even keener on overcoming ‘universalizing, mechanistic or 
reductionist approaches to policy intervention’69 in order to facilitate them. 
The question which arises here is, of course: Why, then, intervene in the first place? If 
solutions may only ever emerge ‘from the bottom-up’ and liberal-universal 
epistemology only hinders this process, why not leave post-conflict and other 
transitional societies to themselves? As Mac Ginty stresses, internationals should be 
vary of ‘romanticis[ing] all things local’.70 That is, for ‘post-liberals’ endogenous 
solutions still have to be somehow ‘facilitated by external actors’.71 In fact, Campbell is 
reintroducing the classic neo-liberal doubts as to whether local actors are really able to 
find appropriate policy solutions all by themselves: ‘Do these actors actually have the 
capacity […]?’72 Paris has made this weak spot in the ‘post-liberal’ argument the target 
of his critique by pointing out that ‘peacebuilders will still need to make crucial choices’, 
‘privileging some structures and not others’.73 And the whole need for intervention, 
including in the ‘post-liberal’ perspective, grows out of the shared understanding that 
there must exist some sort of internal shortcoming requiring outside attention: ‘[I]f post-
conflict society could organize its own governance arrangements without international 
  
7 
 
assistance, there would have been no need or demand for peacebuilding in the first 
place’.74 What differs is that ‘post-liberals’ want to gain from peacebuilding a mutual 
‘pedagogy of peace’ that is ‘as much aimed at the liberal international as it is [at] the 
local […]’.75 As far as international actors are concerned, this self-cleansing learning 
process would allow the ‘Western model itself [to be] modified by its engagement with 
its […] “other”’.76 As far as the interaction between liberal internationals and their non- 
or a-liberal Other is concerned, the ‘post-liberal’ peace would allow for ‘unscripted 
conversations with local communities and elites’.77 Hence, what is new about 
Richmond’s ‘post-liberal’ peace and what distinguishes it from classic neo-liberal 
approaches like IBL is ‘the way [it] engages with non-liberal others’.78 The challenge to 
‘intellectually enable[…] an engagement with the lives of ordinary [non- or a-liberal] 
people’79 is much more central here than in classic neoliberal approaches with their 
willingness to transform, impose and (re-)educate. 
In the remainder, I would like to sketch what the parameters of thought would be if one 
wanted to operate from within a ‘post-liberal’ framework. How would interveners have 
to think (differently) if they wanted to do ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilding properly? And what 
would be the implications for their ability to confidently formulate and instrumentally 
pursue a socially transformative vision for their interaction with the Global South?  
 
 
The fantasy of the ‘local-local’ and the critique of liberal universalism 
 
For ‘post-liberal’ authors, civil society participation, understood as the ‘consideration of 
local cultural knowledge, ontologies, reactions and requirements’, has remained 
‘extremely limited’.80 Civil society participation has been based on an ‘idealized [liberal] 
version’ ‘imported from outside’.81 As a result, what has been created is an ‘artificial 
form of civil society, disconnected from’82 or ‘float[ing] above’83 local processes and 
expectations. For Richmond, ‘[l]iberal bubbles’ have formed ‘with little reach beyond’84 
the capital. Thania Paffenholz has also argued that civil society participation in 
peacebuilding missions has been largely superficial.85 According to Paffenholz, ‘donor-
driven NGO civil society initiatives have limited the capacity of other types of civil 
society to create domestic social capital and ownership’.86 Rather than engaging with 
genuine grassroots actors, there has been a trend to ‘fund a pre-selected set of 
activities carried out by urban elite-based NGOs’.87 In consequence, Paffenholz 
argues, ‘no meta-alternative is presented’.88 According to Richmond, the more 
fundamental reason why civil society participation has been ineffectual and somehow 
fake is that the legitimacy of international interventions has so far been based on 
‘international norms’ and ‘liberal knowledge systems’.89 Interventions have been 
‘unconsciously designed to distance and marginalize uncomfortable and authentic 
local voices, their needs, expectations and practices […]’.90 Here, Richmond echoes 
again the popular Foucauldian governmentality critique that civil society policies are 
actually meant to ‘hold back “uncivil society”, the barbarians, the traditional or 
customary and the non-secular which it is feared lurk behind local politics and await an 
opportunity to undermine the liberal state’.91 Ownership is conceived of only ‘within the 
liberal framework’,92 ‘depoliticizing the really existing context and the local’.93 In this 
disciplinary apparatus, the local appears as an object to be ‘mapped and defined from 
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an external perspective for the purpose of locating it in a rational “liberal” state’.94 
Under these circumstances, local agency 25 ‘remain[s] hidden’95 and its critical 
governance potential is wasted. 
In consequence, what ‘post-liberal’ authors call for is a ‘significant broadening of the 
representational capacity of the international peace architecture’.96 The objective is to 
engage with the ‘full breadth of local agency’ even if it ‘may not conform to Western-
looking templates’.97 Indeed, from the ‘post-liberal’ point of view, the ‘search for an 
“authentic” local’ is to ‘drive[…]’ the whole peacebuilding project.98 The local is the 
centre piece of the argument. But the search for the local really only begins to develop 
its radical creativity once it is framed as the attempt to ‘engage with those who cannot 
speak’,99 to see those who are invisible to the reductionist liberal-universal gaze. In 
order to get a better idea of what that means, we have to look again at Richmond’s 
notion of the ‘local-local’. Richmond sees the ‘local’ as constituted by the elite level and as  
donor-driven.100 The ‘local’ originates in the misplaced projection of the interveners’ liberal 
self onto a non- or a-liberal Other and is ultimately doomed to fail because of its inability to 
take root. In contrast, the more radical ‘local-local’ indicates the existence and diversity of 
‘political society beyond this often liberally projected artifice of elites and civil society’,101 i.e. 
the ‘local’. The ‘local-local’ is ‘far deeper’ and lies beyond the ‘liberally projected artifice’102 of 
intervention. It is defined negatively as that which lies beyond reductionist liberal -universal 
forms of knowledge. And it is precisely the difference to liberal-universal epistemology that is 
behind the ‘post-liberal’ realisation that ‘there is far more peacebuilding capacity at the local 
level than international actors […] could see’.103 Unfortunately, the ‘dominance of liberal 
epistemology’ has generated a ‘blind spot’104 for the genuine ‘local-local’. The 
‘obstacle’ to accessing the ‘local-local’ and putting it in the driver’s seat is epistemic: 
‘Quite simply, many proponents of the liberal peace find it difficult to see the local’.105 
In other words, what is at stake in ‘post-liberal’ conceptions of the local are ‘ways of 
knowing […] that are inaccessible to [interveners] because of Enlightenment, rational 
and individualistic biases’.106 The ‘error’ of liberal peacebuilding is its ‘positivist, 
problem-solving methods and epistemology’.107 The challenge, therefore, is to 
‘transcend reductive analysis’ and open up policy to ‘empathy’ ‘beyond rational and 
even normative epistemologies’.108 Development and peacebuilding policies should be 
about ‘support[ing] their subjects rather then defin[ing] them’.109 As Chandler has 
pointed out, in this perspective, ‘any attempt to know, rather than merely express 
“empathy” is open to hegemonic abuse’.110 Instead of looking for ‘rational patterns’, 
peacebuilders should try to become more attuned to the ‘lived experience’ of conflict 
and avoid ‘being overly reductionist’.111 That is, the notion of the ‘local-local’ calls for 
critical self-reflexivity ‘confront[ing] universalist ideas and practices’.112 The ‘local-local’ 
is an explicit ‘retreat from the certainties and binaries that underpin Western modes of 
thinking’.113 Enabling local participation is a problem of ensuring that – as far as 
possible – policymaking is not ‘tainted by Western, liberal and developed world 
orthodoxies and interests’.114  
Against this background, it becomes clear why Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam 
have been arguing that the ‘epistemological critiques’ of intervention have become a 
field of adversity on which the ‘“liberal” assumptions of Western modernity’115 have 
been questioned. More specifically, the ‘post-liberal’ critique has been a way of 
problematising the applicability of liberalism to an essentialised non-liberal Other.116 This 
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comes out clearly in Franks’ claim that the problems of intervention are ‘inherent in the 
application of the liberal peace’.117 They are the ‘natural effect’118 of implementing the 
liberal peace model in contexts where it does not properly belong. And Richmond’s 
argument also depends on an essentialised boundary between interveners ‘reflect[ing] a 
liberal project’119 and ‘fundamentally different’120 (read non-liberal) intervened. This 
essentialised difference is replicated in the notion of an ‘epistemological […] distance 
between liberal and local politics’.121 In consequence, rather than critiquing intervention 
for its illiberal outcomes or even critiquing liberalism as such for its inability to facilitate 
socio-economic transformation, the ‘spirit’ of the local turn is to undercut ‘liberal 
optimism and notions of universal rights’.122 The concern of ‘post-liberal’ approaches is 
that peacebuilders ‘should […] be far less certain about […] universalism’123 when 
interacting with intervened states and societies, ‘putting aside […] the notion that we 
can all become liberal’.124 So far, the critical academic literature on ‘post-liberal’ 
approaches has focused on this tendency to reproduce essentialised differences and 
hierarchies between Western interveners and their localised Other. That is, discussing 
the limits of modern Western forms of knowledge has, in fact, been about a retreat 
from political and social emancipation and progress.125 This is a poignant critique. 
Where this paper would like to further the discussion or add an additional dimension is 
in working out the detrimental effect of the ‘post-liberal’ search for the hidden and 
idiosyncratic ‘local-local’ on international policymakers’ ability to act purposefully in the 
world. There is a downside to the fantasy of the ‘local-local’ as that which lies beyond 
the blinders of reductionist liberal-universal forms of knowledge: trying to see and 
enable all the local agency which is hidden by modern universal epistemology 
systematically undercuts policymakers’ ‘capacity to create and initiate’.126 By putting 
the unknown knowledge of an essentialised Other at the heart of policy reflection, 
inter-national policymakers’ own epistemic and normative foundations become 
progressively more instable. By trying to ‘engage with those who cannot speak’127 and 
to see those who are invisible, international policymakers lose their own authoritative 
knowledge and policy agency. The ‘post-liberal’ world is one which is increasingly 
unintelligible and immune to political change.  
 
 
The crisis of international authority 
 
As the preceding sections have tried to show, ‘post-liberal’ approaches demand that 
‘peace-building should begin from the local, the everyday’.128 Importantly, in their 
attempt to make the local and even the ‘far deeper local-local’129 the starting point of 
peacebuilding, ‘post-liberals’ encounter a very concrete problem: ‘Who is the “local” 
and where is the “everyday”?’.130 While ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilders acknowledge that 
peace must be ‘negotiated locally’, it is equally clear to them that this process must be 
‘prompted externally’.131 Hence, identifying genuinely local counterparts becomes a top 
priority. For ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilders, this involves overcoming a double obstacle. 
Their ‘methodological challenge’ is to ‘confront[…] the edifice of Western ontological 
assumptions and […] epistemologies […] without resorting to new metanarratives of 
“peace”’.132 As we saw above, liberal politics and territorial forms of political 
organisation have been identified as ‘moment[s] of exclusion’133 and, therefore, have to be 
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discarded. But this has to be achieved in such a way as not to formulate a new ‘claim to 
know on behalf of others’.134 ‘Contextually restructuring’ peacebuilding cannot possibly 
be done within a new ‘general theory’.135 Understanding local context is of a different 
nature than building a self-contained system of generalised analytical assumptions, 
concepts and norms. The goal of contextual peacebuilding is inherently antithetical to 
‘a new […] cartography of power’136 because that would constitute yet another 
epistemic ‘sovereignt[y]’.137 So the starting point of ‘post-liberal’ peacebuilding, i.e. the ‘local-
local’, is something unknown to outsiders and any attempt to know it externally, 
reductively, from above defeats its very purpose. What interveners are left with – what 
‘post-liberalism’ ‘offers’ them – is an ‘ongoing critique’138 of themselves geared towards 
eliminating the remnants of reductionist liberal-universal thinking. This deconstructive 
process reproduces itself continuously through doubt and uncertainty. One can never 
be sure to be non-reductionist and non-imposing enough. In the  ‘post-liberal’ 
framework, peacebuilders can never be sure they are not imposing their Western 
modern episteme again and are talking to an externally induced surrogate civil society 
disconnected from the genuine ‘local-local’ because peace is always ‘situated right at the 
limits of Northern liberalism and social sciences’139 and interveners are defined by  their 
very being liberal. It is no surprise, then, that Richmond himself stresses that, despite 
attempts to increase participation, ‘the local remains elusive for international actors’.140 
What opens up is on ongoing public trial ‘questioning the very foundations of peace-
building’.141 That is the ‘founding myths of Westphalia’:142 state-centrism, territorial borders 
and sovereignty. The key point is that these ‘founding myths’ are not to be substituted 
with an ‘alternative paradigm’ as that would ‘miss the point completely’.143 ‘Post-
liberalism’ is all about ‘not becom[ing] a new universal’ because any ‘discourse of 
power, through knowledge, method, or ideology’ would only render invisible or 
suppress the creative agency that is ‘already developing’144 locally. 
In this way, ‘post-liberal’ authors reflect a growing crisis of auctoritas, i.e. a ‘problem of 
foundational norms’.145 They seem to have abandoned the ‘ideal of a foundational 
authority which someone develops (augments) and takes forward into the present’.146 
Or as Hannah Arendt pointed out, ‘what authority or those in authority constantly 
augment is the foun-dation’.147 In contrast, it appears as if contemporary practices of 
critique go in the opposite direction. They seem to aim at diminution. They vie to take 
apart the existing foundations of liberal modernity, rather than to augment them – or, 
alternatively, to replace them with a fresh set of new foundational norms. They are 
about ‘enabling people to destabilize even deeply institutionalized meanings’,148 rather 
than about (re-)building meaning. In other words, ‘post-liberal’ critiques seem to be part 
of a larger crisis of liberal foundations – one 15 which has not been followed by ‘the 
constitution of a […] novel version of foundational norms for validating authority’.149 
Instead, most contemporary critiques ‘have opted for the strategy of evading the 
question [of “foundational support”] altogether’.150 
Put differently, ‘post-liberalism’ seems to speak for a crisis of ‘epistemic authority’.151 
When Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt define ‘epistemic 
author-20 ity’ as ‘rest[ing] on the assumption that knowledge and expertise are 
unequally distributed, but that there is a common epistemological framework that 
allows us to judge this ine-quality’,152 then it would appear as if today it is precisely this 
erstwhile taken-for-granted, coherent, universalist system of epistemologic references 
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which is being taken apart from within by ‘post-liberal’ approaches. Epistemic and 
normative self-deconstruction is the way in which leading academics and policymakers 
have responded to real-world policy failures. For them, the debacles in Iraq and 
Afghanistan testify to the liberal peace model itself have failed in alien contexts.  
What is more, despite their claim not to ‘collapse into a grand narrative of ideology’,153 
‘post-liberalism’ does posit its own new ontologic hierarchy: Reality over artifice. ‘Post-
liberal’ solutions emerge ‘from the realities of post-conflict societies’ and not from 
‘theoretical ideals’.154 Hence, the ontology of ‘post-liberalism’ privileges ‘non-Western 
life’ over ‘Western models’.155 While ‘post-liberal’ authors welcome this enthronement 
of reality, the drawback seems to be that democratic aspirations have to be given up: 
‘Statebuilding the-orists and practitioners should stop assuming that democracy should 
or could work for everyone’; results may be ‘peaceful but not democratic’.156 With 
Roberts’ comment in mind, it becomes clear how ‘privileging difference over 
universality is not inherently emancipatory or transformative’.157 On the contrary, by 
aiming to work only through what is thought to already be in place, i.e. the ‘local-local’, 
and by constructing it as ‘fundamentally different’,158 interventionary policy becomes 
increasingly passive and status quo oriented. Pursuing a set of normative objectives 
loses political purchase and meaning. What takes its place is a ‘speculative and 
passive search for different, non-liberal forms of knowledge’.159 And this search 
involves a continuous deconstruction of the reductionist liberal-universal foundations 
through which the emancipatory and instrumentalist policy projects of the past used to 
be cohered ideologically.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has offered a critical appraisal of ‘post-liberalism’. It began by analysing 
Paris’ IBL strategy.160 IBL defended the ultimate goal of liberal market democracy but 
demanded greater emphasis on the socio-cultural preconditions of imported Western 
institutions. In this way, IBL called naturally for a thorough ‘social transformation’ of 
post-conflict societies ‘requiring changes in behavior, expectations and norms’.161 
Thus, in classic neoliberal approaches, there exists a strong epistemic hierarchy and a 
continued valorisation of international expertise. Foucauldian governmentality studies 
have made this hierarchy their favoured object of critique. They have opposed IBL as a 
form of governmentality which disciplines non-Western communities into conformity 
with modern liberal standards. ‘Post-liberals’, in turn, have taken up the Foucauldian 
governmentality reading. They equally critique civil society participation for its 
‘governmentalising distance and biopolitical tendency’.162 In reaction, ‘post-liberal’ 
authors have called for a broadening of civil society participation in order to include the 
more diverse and radical ‘local-local’.163 As far as international interveners are 
concerned, identifying the ‘local-local’ requires ‘confronting the edifice of Western 
ontological assumptions and […] epistemologies […] without resorting to new 
metanarratives of “peace”’.164 In ‘post-liberal’ thinking, there is much less of an 
epistemic hierarchy than in IBL. Indeed, although the non-liberal Other still needs to be 
‘prompted externally’,165 the knowledge-power hierarchy between interveners and 
intervened is almost inversed in the ‘post-liberal’ framework. The problem for ‘post-
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liberals’ is that even the radical ‘local-local’ needs to be somehow enabled from the 
outside while remaining largely invisible to the reductionist liberal-universal view. In this 
framework, peacebuilders can never be sure not to be imposing Western modern 
episteme again, build-ing a fake, surrogate civil society floating above the genuine 
‘local-local’. In fact, more often than not, when peacebuilders think they have managed 
to find the ‘local-local’, they will probably just be talking to their liberal-universalist 
avatars again. In the search for the mysterious ‘local-local’, ‘post-liberals’ are forced to 
deconstruct more and more of their obstructive liberal-universal foundations. And 
without these foundations, their engagement with the world becomes increasingly 
passive and status quo-oriented. Pursuing the ‘post-liberal’ fantasy of the ‘local-local’ 
as a policy framework systematically undercuts international policymakers’ auctoritas 
as the ‘capacity to create and initiate’.166 Ironically, ‘post-liberal’ authors started out 
with critiquing the conservative character of contemporary interventions, but their 
rejection of liberal-universal episteme actually ends up reinforcing it. It would seem that 
deliberate, emancipatory social transformation is difficult without an ideological 
baseline – liberal or other – and that today this kind of reductionist and normative 
intellectual engagement with the world is thoroughly discredited.  
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